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Abstract 
Ordoliberalism became during the years of the financial crisis the target of a European-wide critical 
campaign. This school of thought is widely perceived as the ideational source of Germany’s crisis 
politics which has even led to an “ordoliberalisation of Europe”. The essay questions the validity of such 
assessments. It focuses on two aspects which are widely neglected in current debates. One is the 
importance of law in the ordoliberal vision of the ordering of economy and society. The second is its 
cultural and religious background in particular in German Protestantism. The influence of the ordoliberal 
school on European law, so the essay argues, is overrated in all stages of the integration project. Anglo-
American neoliberalism rather than German Ordoliberalism was in the ideational driver seat since the 
1980s. In the responses to the financial crisis the ordoliberal commitment to the rule of law gave way to 
discretionary emergency measures. While the foundational synthesis of economic and legal concepts 
became indefensible, the cultural underpinnings of the ordoliberal tradition survived and developed a 
life of their own in particular in German political discourses. 
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  1 
Introduction 
 
Ordoliberalism is casting its shadow across Europe. Known to just a handful of dyed-in-the-wool 
experts outside the German-speaking world prior to the euro crisis, this theoretical tradition of social 
philosophy has made quite a name for itself over the past seven years. Weighty contributions in the 
press1 and academic publications2 view ordoliberalism as an economic policy concept that is said to 
have guided the German government during the debt crisis. The influence of this policy, they claim, 
had brought about an “ordoliberalisation of Europe”. Contributions echoing this criticism are 
relatively rare in Germany.3 This finding is the starting point of our deliberations: criticism of 
ordoliberalism is above all a criticism of German crisis policy. 
Recent interest in ordoliberalism has been focused closely on its ideas regarding economic policy. Yet 
people forget the extent to which the founding fathers insisted on interdisciplinarity and perceived the 
economic order as a legal order. Besides the fact that ordoliberalism was originally anchored in legal 
concepts, we will go into a second foundational element which is also left largely unconsidered in the 
current debate, namely the fact that the values underlying ordoliberal theory and constituting its 
sociological core are heavily influenced by Protestantism. 
We believe the direct impact ordoliberalism has in shaping German’s policy toward Europe is 
overestimated. The influence of this school on forming the project of integration was minor, even in the 
formative 1950s and 1960s. Its theoretical power and practical relevance have been declining since the 
1960s. Its backing in the legal sciences became weaker and weaker given the impact of American 
“economic analysis of law”.4 Gradually, economists close to the ordoliberal tradition have largely 
                                                     
1  The Guardian, “Let us Introduce you to ‘Ordoliberalism’”, 2 March 2012; The Financial Times, “The Wacky Economics of 
Germany’s Parallel Universe”, 16 November 2014; The Economist, “German Ordoliberalism has had a Big Influence on 
Policymaking during the Euro Crisis”, 9 May 2015. 
2  S. Cesarotto and A. Stirati, “Germany and the European and Global Crises”, (2010) 39 Journal of Political Economy, 56-86; 
V. Berghahn and B. Young, “Reflections on Werner Bonefeld’s ‘Freedom and the Strong State: On German 
Ordoliberalism’ and the Continuing Importance of the Ideas of Ordoliberalism to Understand Germany’s (Contested) Role 
in Resolving the Eurozone Crisis”, (2013) 18 New Political Economy, 768-78; M. Blyth, Austerity: The History of a 
Dangerous Idea, (Oxford University Press, 2013), S. 141; S. Bulmer and W.E. Paterson, “Germany as the EU’sReluctant 
Hegemon? Of Economic Strength and Political Constraints”, (2013) 20 Journal of European Public Policy, 1387-1405; P. 
Dardot and C. Laval, The New Way of the World: On Neoliberal Society, (Verso Books, 2013); Gerhard Schnyder and 
Mathias M. Siems, “The ‘Ordoliberal’ Variety of Neoliberalism”, in: Suzanne J. Konzelmann and Marc Fovargue-Davies 
(eds), Banking Systems in the Crisis; The Faces of Liberal Capitalism, (Routledge, 2013), 250-268; S. Bulmer, “Germany 
and the Eurozone Crisis: Between Hegemony and Domestic Politics”, (2014) 37 West European Politics, 1244-63; T. 
Harjunienu and M. Ojala, “Mediating ‘the German Ideology’? Ordoliberalism and its Alternatives in the Press Coverage 
of the Eurozone Crisis”, (2014) 24 Journal of Contemporary European Studies, 414-430; F. Denord, R. Knaebel and P. 
Rimbert, “L’ordolibéralisme allemand, cage de fer pour le Vieux Continent”, Le Monde diplomatique, August 2015; R. 
Hillebrand, “Germany and its Eurozone Crisis Policy: The Impact of the Country’s Ordoliberal Heritage”, (2015) 33 
German Politics & Society, 6-24; A. Lechevalier, “Eucken under the Pillow: The Ordoliberal Imprint on Social Europe”, 
in: A. Lechevallier and J. Wielgohs (eds), Social Europe: A Dead End: What the Eurozone Crisis is Doing to Europe’s 
Social Dimension, (DJØF Publishing, 2015); P. Nedergaard and H. Snaith, “‘As I Drifted on a River I could not Control’: 
The Unintended Ordoliberal Consequences of the Eurozone Crisis”, (2015) 53 Journal of Common Market Studies, 1094-
1109; D. Schäfer, “A Banking Union of Ideas? The Impact of Ordoliberalism and the Vicious Circle on the EU Banking 
Union”, (2016) 54 Journal of Common Market Studies, 961-980; J. Oksala, “Ordoliberalism as Governmentality”, in: T. 
Biebricher and F.S. Vogelmann (eds), The Birth of Austerity: German Ordoliberalism and Contemporary Neoliberalism, 
(Rowman & Littlefield, 2017). 
3  S. Dullien and U. Guérot, “The Long Shadow of Ordoliberalism: Germany’s Approach to the Euro Crisis”, (2012) 22 
European Council on Foreign Relations Policy Brief; T. Biebricher, “Europe and the Political Philosophy of 
Neoliberalism”, (2013) 12 Contemporary Political Theory, 338-375; idem, “Neoliberalism and Law: The Case of the 
Constitutional Balanced-Budget Amendment”, (2016) 17 German Law Journal, 835-856. 
4  H.-D. Assmann, Ch. Kirchner and E. Schanze, Ökonomische Analyse des Rechts, (Athenäum, 1972) gave important signals. 
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aligned their positions with those of Anglo-Saxon neoclassical economics - ordoliberalism has fallen 
victim to overlying American influences on German economics. It is telling that during the euro crisis, 
there were no genuinely ordoliberal contributions by economists or legal scholars that supported 
Germany’s crisis policy. Opinion pieces by German economists institutionally linked to ordoliberalism 
(through the Walter Eucken Institut, the Stiftung Marktwirtschaft, the Kronberger Kreis) take up public-
choice theories and the new institutional economics in which the original interdependencies between 
law, economics, and the constitution have faded away. 
Nonetheless, we find ordoliberal traditions having indirect influence. This influence is exerted based on 
its sociological core: the underlying Protestant cultural values that originally constituted the foundation 
for ordoliberalism formed and still forms German politicians’ discourse on the crisis. Ordoliberalism 
thus continues to be influential in German politics thanks to its cultural foundations; politicians use 
ordoliberal references symbolically to indicate certain political mindsets and orientations. 
In the following sections, we first outline the framework of ordoliberalism in legal theory (2.), trace the 
history of its early reception (3.), and provide evidence for its cultural anchoring in Protestantism (4.). 
This is followed by an analysis of how ordoliberal theoreticians influenced the establishment of 
European institutions in the early phases of integration (5.). We then turn to European crisis policy (6.) 
and consider the academic decline of ordoliberalism (7). We have devoted a section to how German 
politicians resorted to ordoliberal topoi in their discourse (8) and conclude with a summary (9). 
The Frame of reference in legal theory 
In contrast to the countless current contributions to ordoliberalism, law will assume a key role in our 
reconstruction of the history of its reception. We have compelling reasons for this. Of the three who 
signed the ordoliberal founding document of 1936,5 two were jurists (Franz Böhm and Hans Großmann-
Doerth), and the third (Walter Eucken) was an economist who considered law and economics to be 
interdependent orders. Michel Foucault, who in 1979 discussed ordoliberalism in five of his 12 lectures 
on la naissance de la biopolitique, identified the constitutive significance of the law, which the current 
criticism scarcely acknowledges, very precisely: “The juridical gives form to the economic, and the 
economic would not be what it is without the juridical.”6 Legal rules and economic activity are mutually 
dependent. “[T]he state can make legal interventions in the economic order only if these legal 
interventions take the form solely of the introduction of formal principles.” 
In the early Federal Republic, it was primarily jurists who communicated the practical-political 
influence of ordoliberal thought. Their most important place of activity was not Freiburg, however, but 
Frankfurt. That was where the later President of the Commission Walter Hallstein had been appointed 
professor in 1941 and had become president of the university in 1946; Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker, who 
was to grow into the leadership role of the “second-generation” ordoliberals, completed his habilitation 
in 1958 under Franz Böhm, who had joined the faculty in 1946, as did Kurt Biedenkopf, who defended 
ordoliberal positions steadfastly as a scholar, policy consultant, and politician, in 1963.7 However, 
Böhm’s chair of economic law was assumed in 1963 by a certain Rudolf Wiethölter, who wrote the 
most succinct analysis of ordoliberal legal theory and classifies its core characteristics, or proprium, as 
a social theory. As summarised concisely in Wiethölter’s typical fashion: The “dominant motto,” he 
writes, is 
                                                     
5  F. Böhm, “Die außerstaatliche (‘natürliche’) Gesetzmäßigkeit des wettbewerblichen Wirtschaftsprozesses”, in: W. Stützel, 
C. Watrin, H. Willgerodt and K. Hohmann (eds), Grundtexte zur Sozialen Marktwirtschaft: Zeugnisse aus zweihundert 
Jahren ordnungspolitischer Diskussion, (Fischer Verlag, [1936] 1981), 135-142. 
6  M. Foucault, Geschichte der Gouvernementalität II. Die Geburt der Biopolitik, (Suhrkamp Verlag, 2014), 163 & 171. 
7  K.H. Biedenkopf, “Über das Verhältnis wirtschaftlicher Macht zum Privatrecht”, in: H. Coing et al. (eds), Festschrift zum 
70. Geburtstag von Franz Böhm , (C.F. Müller, 1965); most recently, idem, Der Weg zum Euro. Stationen einer verpassten 
Chance, (Hertie School of Governance, 2012) with telling reservations against the introduction of the euro. 
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“order (= ‘reasonable assembly of the diverse to form a whole’ - Eucken, taking on the scholastic 
concept of ordo). This ‘order’ is a legal order: ‘Economic order is legal constitution’ (Böhm). As a 
legal order, it is an order respecting and protecting “freedom” [...] core hypothesis on the normative 
proprium and impact of ‘law’: The economic order as an order of private law constituted in terms of 
competition policy develops material freedom and social equality of opportunity from private 
autonomy and the system of legal transactions through the fundamental ideas of private law which are 
functionalized in terms of competition law (freedom of contract, freedom to do business, freedom to 
own property).”8 
According to Wiethölter, this was neither an economic theory (“theoretical economics based on a law 
of causality” or “economic policy designed to implement a particular programme”) nor a legal theory 
as generally understood; rather, it was a “political theory of society” that “conceived of a ‘third way’ 
beyond liberalism and socialism as a permanent and liberal order of peace”.9 Wiethölter wrote this 
critical précis of ordoliberal legal theory at the time when the ordoliberal tradition was dominant in 
economic law in the Federal Republic and representatives of the school held leading positions in all the 
important consulting institutions. 
However, as already mentioned above,10 ordoliberalism has become less attractive since the 1970s. In 
the arguments related to the financial crisis, opinions committed to the conceptual foundations and the 
theoretical ambitions of ordoliberalism are hardly perceptible any more. We will return to this in more 
detail.11 To formulate our initial hypothesis more precisely even at this point: The “law of the crisis” 
with which Germany and Europe reacted to the financial crisis brought about a “delegalisation” of the 
EU. The numerous critics who wish to see an ordoliberal agenda at work in the crisis policy fail to 
recognise this circumstance. It is our opinion that the dramatic plight Europe found itself in was also 
due to the fact that the law - ordoliberal law just as well as any other law - falls short of legitimately 
formulating what comprises European governance. 
Reception History 
The long national and briefer European reception history of the ordoliberal theory was by no means only 
straightforward and successful. Although ordoliberalism was influential during some phases, resistance 
against it both in the Federal Republic and in Europe caused it to fail. 
Weimar 
In its beginnings in the early 1920s and 1930s, ordoliberalism constituted itself as an oppositional 
science: forward thinkers such as Eucken, Böhm, Rüstow, and Röpke opposed both laissez-faire 
liberalism and manifestations of power relationships typical of German organized capitalism. Alexander 
Rüstow’s 1932 polemic against “paleoliberalism” speaks volumes.12 Walter Eucken’s “Staatliche 
Strukturwandlungen und die Krise des Kapitalismus” (“Structural Transformations of the State and the 
                                                     
8  R. Wiethölter, “Wirtschaftsrecht”, in: A. Görlitz (ed), Handlexikon zur Rechtswissenschaft, (Ehrenwirth, 1972), 531-538, at 
534 f. 
9  Ibid., 535. 
10  Section 1 with fn. 8. 
11  Section 6. 
12  A. Rüstow, “Paläoliberalismus, Kollektivismus und Neoliberalismus in der Wirtschafts- und Sozialordnung”, in: K. Forster 
(ed.), Christentum und Liberalismus – Studien und Berichte der Katholischen Akademie in Bayern, (1932); idem, 
“Interessenpolitik oder Staatspolitik?”, (1932) 7 Der Deutsche Volkswirt, 169-172; idem, “Freie Wirtschaft – starker Staat”, 
(1932) 187 Schriften des Vereins für Socialpolitik, 62-69. 
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Crisis of Capitalism”)
13
 had the same general thrust. Other advocates of the school, later renowned, 
contributed their thoughts at the same time or soon after.
14 Franz Böhm’s monograph on “Wettbewerb 
und Monopolkampf” (“Competition and Struggle against Monopolies”), which was published in 1933, 
was to become the foundation for a school of legal thought.
15
 The new liberalism distinguished itself 
from the historical school of economics and was firmly opposed to socialist ambitions.
16 But it was not 
laissez-faire liberalism - above all, because the state was assigned the task of guaranteeing the 
competitive order of the economy. Wilhelm Röpke used the vexing oxymoron “liberal interventionism” 
to describe this function.
17 The idea was in fact to replace the old “paleoliberal” night-watchman state 
with a “strong state”.
18
 
The call for a strong state in particular provoked nefarious suspicions. We also view them as anticipating 
disapproval being seen today. They do not impact ordoliberalism. The no longer only “quantitatively”, 
but now “qualitatively” strong state that Carl Schmitt and some of his contemporaries called for19 was 
to derive its political clout from discretionary opportunities for intervention that threw the shackles off 
the rule of law. Ordoliberalism’s strong state was supposed to use its strength to shape a legal 
constitution in which a free and fair order of competition would develop. Its power to shape policy was 
intended to help contain economic power while binding itself to legal forms of action. This is how Carl 
Schmitt’s strong state differs fundamentally from the ordoliberals’ rule-bound Ordnungspolitik. 
Post-war Germany 
Ordoliberalism is one of the few traditions that National Socialism had not damaged permanently. The 
“strong state” just mentioned remained an ordoliberal desideratum in a sense well defined in economic 
and societal policy. Franz Böhm led the way in formulating this program more precisely.20 He saw the 
regulatory weakness of the Weimar Republic’s democratic pluralism regarding the concentration of 
power in the economy as one cause for the National Socialists seizing power. After 1945, he emphasised 
that “the refined competitive economy” was compatible with democracy under the rule of law, in 
contrast to a “centrally planned economy”, but also more compatible than a “mixed economic system”.21 
                                                     
13  W. Eucken, “Staatliche Strukturwandlungen und die Krisis des Kapitalismus”, (1997) [1932] 48 ORDO: Jahrbuch für die 
Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 5-25. 
14  A. Müller-Armack, Entwicklungsgesetze des Kapitalismus. Ökonomische, geschichtstheoretische und soziologische Studien 
zur modernen Wirtschaftsverfassung, (Junker und Dünnhaupt, 1932. On Müller-Armack’s life and work, cf. D. Haselbach, 
Autoritärer Liberalismus und Soziale Marktwirtschaft. Gesellschaft und Politik im Ordoliberalismus, (Nomos Verlag, 
1991, 117 ff.. 
15  F. Böhm, Wettbewerb und Monopolkampf; eine Untersuchung zur Frage des wirtschaftlichen Kampfrechts und zur Frage 
der rechtlichen Struktur der geltenden Wirtschaftsordnung, (Carl Heymanns Verlag, [1933] 1964). 
16  W. Abelshauser, Kulturkampf. Der deutsche Weg in die neue Wirtschaft und die amerikanische Herausforderung, (Kadmos, 
2003), 158 ff. 
17   W. Röpke, German Commercial Policy, (Longmans, Green and Company, 1934), 40 f; idem, Die Lehre von der Wirtschaft, 
(Springer, 1937); on Röpke, cf., M. Glasman, Unnecessary Suffering: Managing Market Utopia, (Verso Books, 1996), 52 
ff. 
18  Rüstow, speaking to the Verein für Socialpolitik (German Economic Association): “A strong state, a state superior to the 
economy, where it belongs”, in: Rüstow, “Interessenpolitik oder Staatspolitik?/Freie Wirtschaft – starker Staat”, note 12 
above, 62-69. 
19  C. Schmitt, “Starker Staat und gesunde Wirtschaft”, in: G. Maschke (ed.), Carl Schmitt, Staat, Großraum, Nomos. Arbeiten 
aus den Jahren 1916-1969, (Duncker & Humblot, [1933] 1995). 
20  Cf., above all, Böhm, note 15 above; Böhm, note 5 above (1936) and his again programmatic contribution to the first Ordo-
Jahrbuch from 1948: “Das Reichsgericht und die Kartelle: eine wirtschaftsverfassungsrechtliche Kritik an dem Urteil des 
RG vom 4. Febr. 1897, RGZ 38/155”, (1948) 1 Ordo: Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 197-21. 
21  Foundational, see F. Böhm, Wirtschaftsverfassung und Staatsverfassung, (Mohr/Siebeck, 1950). On Böhm, above all, see 
R. Wiethölter, “Franz Böhm (1895-1977)”, in: B. Diestelkamp and M. Stolleis (eds), Juristen an der Universität Frankfurt 
a.M., (Nomos Verlag, 1989), 207-252. 
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Because of these boundaries to three sides - toward the totalitarian planned state, toward laissez-faire 
liberalism, towards the regulatory state - the idea of a “constitution for competition” guaranteed by the 
state was considered an attractive guiding principle for the reconstruction of the economic and legal 
order. Walter Hallstein is worthy of mention as one of the most influential advocates of this principle; 
in his 1946 lecture as president of the University of Frankfurt,22 he advocated the “restoration” of private 
law and of private-law freedoms, in line with the “Freiburg message”.23 
In the early Federal Republic, ordoliberalism was strong, but had unsecured flanks. One resulted from 
the tension between the (anti-interventionist) competition regime and the Basic Law’s principle of the 
welfare state (which called for interventionist activism) - this line of conflict is personified in Alfred 
Müller-Armack,24 who praised the compatibility of his project of a “social market economy” with the 
“Freiburg message”, although his praise was unable to dispel the ordoliberals’ scepticism. More 
important was the second flank, namely, the weakness of the “constitution for competition”. In his work 
on the history of German private law in the Weimar and Bonn Republics, Knut Wolfgang Nörr
25
 
differentiates between two concepts that took effect in parallel and in opposition to each other in the 
course of (German) economic legal history: the “organised economy” and the “social market economy” 
(which he understands simply as an ordoliberal project). This coexistence of the “organised economy” 
on the one hand and ordoliberalism on the other, he claimed, had institutionalised a contradiction. In 
fact, ordoliberalism had dominated the thinking of only the scholars of private and economic law. In 
state, constitutional, and administrative law, the influence of the ordoliberal school remained weak, and, 
instead, the proponents of an organised and corporatist economic constitution were dominant. For this 
reason, Nörr diagnosed a two-pronged approach to economic policy and constitutional law as a basic 
phenomenon in the genesis of the Bonn Republic: “Concerning the economic order which was to shape 
the new state, we must speak of nothing less than a double mise-en-scène, of two productions of the 
same dramatic piece that were oblivious to each other.”
26 Dramatic encounters certainly did take place. 
They include two cases before the Federal Constitutional Court in which the ordoliberal postulate of an 
“economic constitution” structured along competitive lines was rejected.27 
                                                     
22  W. Hallstein, “Wiederherstellung des Privatrechts”, (1946) Süddeutsche Juristenzeitung, 1-7; differently, idem, “Von der 
Sozialisierung des Privatrechts”, (1942) 102 Zeitschrift für die gesamten Staatswissenschaften, 530-546. 
23  On all this in more detail, see C. Joerges, “The Science of Private Law and the Nation-State”, in: Francis Snyder (ed), The 
Europeanization of Law. The Legal Effects of European Integration, (Hart 2000, 47-82.; F. Kübler, “Wirtschaftsrecht in 
der Bundesrepublik – Versuch einer wissenschaftshistorischen Bestandsaufnahme”, in: D. Simon (ed.), Rechtswissenschaft 
in der Bonner Republik. Studien zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte der Jurisprudenz, (Suhrkamp Verlag, 1994), 364-385. 
24  In the eyes of other orthodox ordoliberals such as Eucken or Röpke, the synthesis of the Catholic social doctrine and the 
Protestant ordoliberalism that Müller-Armack strove to achieve with his conception of a social irenics and the term “social 
market economy” made him a marginal figure in the ordoliberal paradigm, although he himself underlined his commitment 
to ordoliberalism (see C. Joerges and F. Rödl, “The ‘Social Market Economy’ as Europe’s Social Model?”, in: L. 
Magnusson and B. Stråth (eds), A European Social Citizenship? Preconditions for Future Policies in Historical Light, 
(Lang, 2005). His boss, Ludwig Erhard, is considered the politically most prominent ordoliberal; as an economist and 
professor in Nuremburg, he contributed little to the development of ordoliberal theory (but much too effectively marketing 
it to the public). Eucken and Böhm are undisputedly viewed as the founding fathers of ordoliberalism; Röpke and Rüstow 
are considered representatives of a sociological ordoliberalism; and Hayek, Hoppmann, and Mestmäcker represent the 
second generation, which combined elements from the Anglo-Saxon and the Austrian schools. 
25  K.W. Nörr, Die Republik der Wirtschaft. Teil I: Von der Besatzungszeit bis zur Großen Koalition, (Mohr/Siebeck, 1999), 5 
ff. 
26  Ibid., 84. 
27  Investment aid judgment of 20 July 1954, BVerfGE 4, 7 and co-determination judgment of 1 March 1979, BVerfGE 50, 
290. 
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Cultural Underpinnings and contexts of the political agenda of ordoliberalism since the 
Weimar Republic 
Just as is the case with its legal-theory aspects, the normative and ethical roots of ordoliberalism have 
hardly been mentioned in the debate about an “ordoliberalisation” of Europe. 
The founding fathers of ordoliberalism saw the reasons for Weimar’s decline not only in the 
undermining of the liberal competitive economy through cartels and monopolies. 
For this reason, the churches were to be strengthened again as “powers providing order” (Eucken). 
Eucken had already commented in the 1930s that the loosening ties to the church had facilitated people 
turning to secularisms in the Weimar period and that “religion had increasingly lost the power to provide 
individuals’ lives, and thus also their economic activity, a context of meaning”.28 For this reason, the 
ordoliberals took an interesting, duplicitous approach: on the one hand, they invoked the churches as 
supporting authorities, while on the other, they sought to create a surrogate religion by incorporating 
strong underlying values. A “sociological liberalism” was to replace a “sociologically blind liberalism” 
and was to help “embed [the market] in a higher overall order”.29 In reference to Weber, Woodruff calls 
this the attempt to develop a theodicy for the purpose of “adding an ethical dimension to the market”.30 
Böhm then emphasised that “competition” was the “morals of the free market economy”.31 In so doing, 
the ordoliberals did not invent a genuinely new canon of values, but went back to what was tried and 
tested. Numerous “explicitly normative-anthropological deliberations” of the ordoliberals left their mark 
on “the strong affinity of a liberal ethos largely influenced by Protestantism”.32 
The “deep Protestant grammar”33 of ordoliberalism was no accident. All the key figures of the first 
ordoliberal generation were Protestants. Eucken wrote in a 1942 letter to Rüstow: “I could neither live 
nor work if I did not believe that God exists.”34 The ordoliberal project that developed in the late 1930s 
and early 1940s in the Freiburg circles was therefore the genuinely Protestant attempt to design an 
economic order. The project would later distance itself from the social-Catholic, the Keynesian-welfare-
state, and the neoclassical Austrian-Anglo-Saxon competition. The key figure was the Protestant 
theologian Dietrich Bonhöffer. Between 1938 and 1944, he brought Protestant theologians (Otto 
Dibelius, Constantin von Dietze), Protestant economists (Walter Eucken, Leonard Miksch, Adolf 
Lampe), Protestant jurists (Franz Böhm, Hans Großmann-Doerth), and Protestant historians (Gerhard 
Ritter) together in the Bonhöffer Kreis and the Arbeitsgemeinschaft Erwin von Beckerath in Freiburg.35 
The Freiburger Denkschrift, which originated from these circles and was to be the blueprint for post-
war reconstruction, laid out the first coherent Protestant economic and social ethics. 
                                                     
28  Eucken, note 13 above, 5-25. 
29  W. Röpke, Jenseits von Angebot und Nachfrage, 2nd ed.(Rentsch, 1958), 19. 
30  D.M. Woodruff, “Ordoliberalism, Polanyi, and the Theodicy of Markets”, J. Hien and C. Joerges (eds), Ordoliberalism, Law 
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Its underlying values clearly differentiate ordoliberalism from Anglo-Saxon liberalism. Although self-
interest, which drives people to compete with each other economically, does induce them to give their 
best, it can also bring them to manipulate competition to their own benefit. Just as in Protestantism, 
ordoliberalism considers people to be “neither angels nor devils”,36 but rather “justified and sinners at 
the same time; that is why it is decisive to place them within an order that disciplines the peccator”.37 
The ordoliberal idea to employ the state as protector of the economic constitution reflects the Protestant 
continental-European views of human nature. Especially the US variants of ascetic Protestantism focus 
on the freedoms and rights of the individual. This often culminates in hostility toward the state which is 
alien to ordoliberals (sic!). Continental-European ascetic Protestantism attempted to strengthen the 
morally proper behaviour of its communities by creating a res publica christiana, a Christian state 
order.38 In his work, Eucken seeks a compromise between “a Calvinist theocracy with its near identity 
of church and state and the Lutheran two-kingdoms doctrine with its separation of the spiritual and 
secular spheres”.39 His concepts mirror Bonhöffer’s “authoritative-paternalistic [...] thinking” that 
“trusts an order and authority based on law and responsibility more than individual freedom”.40 
Ordoliberalism’s notion of society is not paternalistic, even though the state’s capability to provide order 
is so important to it. The state is supposed to hold back and limit itself to setting underlying conditions 
for the social order. Ordoliberals reject social transfer payments as false incentives. Unconditional 
transfers for reasons of solidarity would in the end result in the “total catastrophe for state and society” 
and make citizens “slaves of the state”.41 Instead, the state should limit itself to ensuring equal 
opportunity and creating the conditions for helping people help themselves. The deep Protestant 
grammar of ordoliberalism gave it a specific concept of solidarity. Help should always be limited to 
what is absolutely necessary in order to set incentives for proper ethical behaviour (hard work, solidarity, 
frugality).42 This is the only way for people to liberate themselves from misery through their own efforts. 
That is the Protestant core of empowerment of the individual that results from the ordoliberal logic; this 
attitude is visible time and again in German politicians’ discourse during the euro crisis. 
Thus, ordoliberalism distinguished itself clearly from Catholic social ethics, the major religious and 
political doctrine opposing it in the 1950s and 1960s.43 The Catholic conception of the human being 
assumes that individuals are not equipped with the same intellectual, moral, and physical capabilities. 
For this reason, ensuring fair and equal starting conditions and opportunities, as ordoliberals do, would 
not suffice for Catholic social ethics; instead, society must also guarantee a certain amount of 
redistribution.44 Nonetheless, both sides tried time and again to create a synthesis of the two Christian 
ideas about the economic system. 
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Müller-Armack’s attempt to create a synthesis was the concept of the “social market economy”.45 
Müller-Armack’s “social irenics” did not meet with the approval of all representatives of ordoliberalism, 
but the term “social market economy” became so popular that ordoliberal purists began to claim the 
concept for themselves at the latest since Germany’s economic miracle and Erhard’s book “Prosperity 
through Competition”. So a robust theoretical synthesis that did justice to the ideas of both the Protestant 
and the Catholic factions was never elaborated. 
There were political tensions too. Although both the social-Catholic and the ordoliberal-Protestant 
factions had come together in the newly established Christian Democratic Union (CDU), the traditional 
mistrust with which social Catholicism approached economic liberalism soon regained the upper hand. 
The old alliances between Catholicism, economic corporatism, and the Bismarckian welfare state 
formed anew.46 The Protestant ordoliberals responded to this alliance with suspicion. The relationships 
being renewed were too similar to those they had opposed in the 1920s. The leading ordoliberals could 
not identify with and reconcile themselves to the de facto constitution of the Federal Republic’s 
economy - its decidedly corporatist elements, the tendencies of political Catholicism toward economic 
democracy, and the restoration of the Bismarckian welfare state under the Catholic chancellor 
Adenauer.47 They saw Germany on the road to serfdom that Hayek had prophesied for welfare-state 
agendas.48 
The negative attitude toward social policy also became important in the first federal cabinets, in the 
arguments between Adenauer, a Catholic, and Erhard, a Protestant. The controversy around the reform 
of the pension system between 1955 and 1957, which was to become the new foundation for the Federal 
Republic’s welfare state, was the strongest. Erhard railed against the “poison of dynamization” and 
wanted to reduce pensions to a minimum.49 To Röpke, the planned reform was “the prosthesis of a 
society crippled by proletarism and crumbled to bits through massification”.50 
In the end, the ordoliberals had to concede defeat, and the presumably most popular reform of the post-
war period was introduced. In return, Erhard was permitted to initiate the antitrust law, complete the 
Bundesbank Act, and construct the German Council of Economic Experts as an independent body in 
which ordoliberal expertise was to be bundled and be politically untouchable and which was to advise 
the Federal government. But in fact, the institutional agenda of the ordoliberals was constantly 
circumvented in the German “negotiation democracy”.51 The German post-war order was therefore not 
only a compromise between capital and labour, as suggested by the term “social market economy”, but 
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a compromise between the social ethics and ideas about the economic system held by the two major 
religions in Germany, as Philip Manow emphasises.52 
The turn to Europe 
The relationship between ordoliberalism and the project of European integration was not one of mutual 
affection.53 The disappointments about Germany’s economic and societal policies may have favoured 
the turn to Europe, but whether and to what extent such hopes were fulfilled is a different matter. On 
the side of the ordoliberal school, we see the willingness to cooperate, but also ex post facto 
rationalisations, adaptations, and finally failures. Three development phases can be differentiated. 
The formative phase of “constitutionalisation” of the EEC Treaty 
Ordoliberalism and its Ordnungstheorie were practically unknown beyond Germany’s borders. Even 
within Germany, European law specialists, whose background was mainly in public law (Staatsrecht), 
hardly took note of ordoliberalism.54 Yet legal scholars and the courts certainly did set the tone in 
shaping the project of integration. But it was not ordoliberalism, but rather the project of “integration 
through law” which represented the legal field’s claim to leadership, whereby law presented itself as a 
stringently constructed system - a doctrine in the style of German “jurisprudence of concepts.” 
Summarised briefly: 
Norms of the EEC Treaty which are sufficiently concrete apply directly in the Member States. Since 
these norms apply directly, they must take precedence over national law. This applies in particular to 
the fundamental economic freedoms which can be asserted by Europe’s market citizens before the 
European Court of Justice, countering relevant national legislation. This Court safeguards the 
uniformity of European law. That is why its interpretation must be binding. 
These are the core concepts whose interaction comprises the so-called constitutionalisation of the 
European Treaties. They have taken on paradigmatic significance, and have convinced and guided 
generations of lawyers.55 Political, social, and economic determinants of this development of the law 
were disregarded. The legal doctrine of European law cannot explain the success of this doctrine. Its 
practical impact only becomes intelligible based on how it functions for a project of integration 
conceived of as being market-rational. And it is within precisely this explanatory framework that it 
becomes understandable why the orthodoxy of European law is attractive to ordoliberalism:56 the 
freedoms guaranteed in the EEC Treaty, the opening up of national economies, the bans on 
discrimination, and the commitment to a system of undistorted competition were interpreted as a 
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“decision” in favour of an economic constitution conforming to the underlying conditions of a market-
based order. The EEC could be understood as a legal order committed to maintaining economic 
freedoms and protecting competition by means of supranational institutions that precisely because of 
this gained a constitutional legitimacy independent of that of the democratic nation-state - and that 
simultaneously placed limits on the Community’s scope of political action.57 In this way, ordoliberalism 
was able to answer the question about the legitimacy of the project of integration more conclusively 
than the prevailing orthodoxy. The fact that the EEC had constituted itself as a “market without a state”58 
did not raise eyebrows. Independent institutions that cannot be guided politically certainly do satisfy an 
ordoliberal constitution of the economy, once the “basic decision” in favour of such an order has been 
taken. 
So, even during the formative phase of the process of integration, do we already have to contend with it 
“ordoliberalising” Europe? Such an assumption would amount to the mere possibility of a reconstruction 
of the project of integration along ordoliberal lines being taken at face value. The ordoliberal vision of 
an autonomous transnational economic constitution was a normative project that was hardly noticed, let 
alone recognized, outside of Europe. As Abelshauser showed,59 it was impossible to reach consensus 
about it even between the Ministry for Economic Affairs and the Federal Foreign Office. Giandomenico 
Majone observes soberly and soberingly:60 in the 1950s, planification and interventionist practices were 
commonplace in the founding states in all sectors of the economy - how could defeated Germany, of all 
countries, have been able to prevail in Europe with a liberal Ordnungspolitik that could not even be 
implemented domestically? Is it legitimate to present the acceptance found by the chapter on competition 
policy as an ordoliberal moment even though it appears simply imperative that the continued existence 
of barriers to trade is incompatible with the agenda of market integration; that, on the one hand, 
governments must be kept from creating a competitive advantage for their own economies through 
subsidies, and, on the other, companies must not be permitted to organise market compartmentalisation? 
After all this, even limiting the Community to the economy and by doing so foregoing a European labour 
and social constitution, which indeed initiated the “decoupling” of the social dimension from the 
institutionalisation of Europeanised “undistorted competition”,61 cannot be exposed so easily as 
(backhanded) cunning on the part of ordoliberal reason. Did it not stand to reason instead to set aside 
such efforts to expand and deepen the project of integration because opening up the national economies 
and removing barriers to trade were considered a win-win matter even by socially oriented economists62 
and it could be assumed that the social security systems organised along nation-state lines would remain 
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intact in the golden age of “embedded liberalism”?6364 It is telling that ordoliberal protagonists were 
undeterred by such declarations in their own interpretation of integration.65 
Von Hayek’s and Mestmäcker’s “Neo-ordoliberalism” 
Europe’s integration through law experienced and withstood many a crisis, therefore progressing only 
slowly - until in 1985 Delors, the charismatic President of the Commission, triggered an unprecedented 
dynamic with his “White Paper on completion of the internal market”.66 Its agenda was met with strong 
approval by the ordoliberal camp, but just as in the previous section on the “constitutionalisation of the 
treaties” and the “integration through law,” it would be too simplistic to conclude again that an 
“ordoliberalisation” of Europe were taking place on the basis of the affinities between the practice of 
integration policy and its theoretical reconstruction. 
The affinities and discrepancies between Delors’s internal market initiative and the ambitions of the 
ordoliberal school become apparent when placed in the context of the revision of ordoliberal legal 
theory, which was carried out in the national context as early as the 1960s.67 It was a revision of 
paradigmatic dimensions. It took place when Friedrich A. von Hayek returned from Chicago to succeed 
ur-Freiburger Walter Eucken. Von Hayek’s theorem of “competition as a discovery procedure”68 
became the new guiding star for the second generation of German post-war ordoliberalism. Erich 
Hoppmann, who was appointed von Hayek’s successor in Freiburg in 1968 and then became director of 
the Walter Eucken Institut in 1970, again as von Hayek’s successor, was decisive in keeping the 
connection between economics and jurisprudence alive. His congenial companion as a legal scholar was 
Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker, a student of Böhm’s, who was the leading theorist and also the most 
influential representative of the new generation. The opinions on the internal market initiative by the 
protagonists of the ordoliberal tradition, specifically those of the Board of Academic Advisors to the 
Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs69 and the Monopolies Commission,70 are to be seen against this 
background. 
The principle of “mutual recognition” of product standards and regulations, which was introduced by 
the ECJ’s legendary Cassis ruling and systematically developed in the Commission’s White Paper, was 
understood as institutionalising a regulatory competition which was to expose national laws to an 
international competition for the “best” regulation. Tendencies in the ECJ’s rulings to have European 
antitrust law strengthen the supervision of national legislation were understood in the same vein. This 
reorientation of antitrust law centred on a core element of the ordoliberal tradition, namely controlling 
                                                     
63  On the concept, see J.G. Ruggie, “International Regimes, Transactions and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar 
Economic Order”, (1982) 36 International Organization, 375-415; J. Steffek, Embedded Liberalism and its Critics: 
Justifying Global Governance in the American Century, (Springer, 2006). 
64  Cf. S. Giubboni, Social Rights and Market Freedoms in the European Constitution. A Labour Law Perspective , (Cambridge 
University Press, 2006), who argues: “[T]he apparent flimsiness of the social provisions of the Treaty of Rome (and of the 
slightly less meagre ones of the Treaty of Paris) was in reality consistent with the intention, imbued with the embedded 
liberalism compromise, not only to preserve but hopefully to expand and strengthen the Member States’ powers of 
economic intervention and social governance: i.e., their ability to keep the promise of protection underlying the new social 
contract signed by their own citizens at the end of the war” (loc. cit., 16); similarly F. Rödl, “Arbeitsverfassung”, in: A. v. 
Bogdandy and J. Bast (eds), Europäisches Verfassungsrecht, 2nd ed. (Springer, 2009), 855-904, at 867. 
65  Cf. the references in W. Sauter and H. Schepel, State and Market in European Union Law: The Public and Private Spheres 
of the Internal Market before the EU Courts, (Cambridge University Press, 2009), 13-15. 
66  Commission of the EC 1985. 
67  Pierre Dardot and Christian Laval call this turnaround “neo-ordoliberalism” (Dardot & Laval, note 2 above, 205 ff). 
68  F.A. v. Hayek, “Wettbewerb als Entdeckungsverfahren”, reprinted in idem, Freiburger Studien. Gesammelte Aufsätze, 
(Mohr, 1969), 249-265. 
69  Board of Academic Advisors to the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs 1986. 
70  Monopolies Commission 1990, 401. 
Josef Hien & Christian Joerges 
12 Department of Law Working Papers 
private power by controlling competition. The Chicago School declared this objective misguided 
because it did not promote efficiency at all. In effect, this corresponded to the notions of Hayek’s theory 
of “competition as a discovery procedure”, which the legal scholars of the “second generation” of the 
ordoliberal school had adopted.71 Protecting the freedom of entrepreneurial activities, they maintained, 
required above all striking down anticompetitive regulations and limiting government subsidies. 
Deregulation and privatisation policies now determined Europe’s agenda. As was already the case in the 
formative phase of the project of integration, it would again be premature to conclude, on the basis of 
these affinities between the reorientations of the “second generation” and Anglo-Saxon neoliberalism, 
which had been adopted in Europe, that German “neo-ordoliberalism” was successful.72 
Besides these affinities, however, there were also considerable discrepancies. They became manifest 
when the internal market initiative entangled the Community in a growing number of social regulatory 
issues concerning environmental, labour, and consumer protection and established an increasingly 
extensive regulatory machinery. It was now about re-regulation, not de-regulation, a finding that had to 
irritate Anglo-Saxon neoliberals and German neo-ordoliberals.73 The weight and the dynamics of the 
new regulatory policies were ignored or underestimated by Ordnungstheorie and Ordnungspolitik.74 The 
new chapter on industrial policy was taken note of - and rejected.75 Once the European policy 
competencies had been broadened and the relevant regulatory bodies had been established, it was no 
longer comprehensible how one could continue to assign a constitutional core function to the “system 
of undistorted competition”. It had become clear that Europe placed little trust in “competition as a 
discovery procedure”.76 Ordoliberalism adopted a critical distance.77 
The Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in the Maastricht Treaty as a pyrrhic victory 
The Maastricht Treaty was the hitherto most ambitious integration project. The competencies of the 
project, which was from then on called “Union”, were expanded to include environmental and industrial 
policy. A European polity emerged. The approaches of a “social Europe” were strengthened. An “ever 
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closer Union” was to develop. There was nothing genuinely ordoliberal about any of this. But there was 
also the Economic and Monetary Union: an independent central bank, the commitment to price stability, 
support for the currency through a Stability Pact. Was all this not ordoliberal? 
Concerning the argument accompanying the treaty coming into existence, we must refer to the relevant 
analyses.78 Here, we limit our observations to a legal dispute: the Maastricht Treaty was brought before 
the German Federal Constitutional Court, whose decision of 12 October 1993 caused quite a sensation 
and shock among scholars of European law:79 the Community, the court claimed, was merely an 
association of states; the Federal Constitutional Court had the right to review whether the system of 
power was being heeded; allegiance to “ultra vires legal acts” was to be refused. The Constitutional 
Court also found that it was a dictate of democracy for the populace to have the opportunity “to give 
legal expression [...] to that which - relatively homogeneously - joins it together intellectually, socially, 
and politically”.80 
The criticism triggered by all this81 drew attention away from arguments put forward by the 
complainants that are much more important in our context: in particular, they claimed that the European 
Union had such far-reaching competencies that the nation-states were no longer in a position to 
discharge important tasks. This erosion of national statehood, they asserted, called the continued 
existence of democratic statehood into question altogether. This line of argument prompted the Federal 
Constitutional Court to position the constitutional democracy of the Federal Republic of Germany in 
opposition to the continuing erosion of its statehood. Although the ruling ultimately approved European 
integration, it arrived at this result by taking up ordoliberal theorems. In the process, it itself subverted 
its demand for preserving democratic decision-making power and relinquished the Member States’ 
political control over their economies. 
How was that possible, and why did nobody notice? One fundamental contradiction in the reasons given 
for the ruling actually appears obvious. It is true that the Federal Constitutional Court declares that 
“fundamental” powers are to be left to the Bundestag as an essential constitutional requirement. But 
then the reasons given for the ruling make a strictly ordoliberal about-face: economic integration, the 
court said, was a non-political process that was taking shape autonomously and beyond the Member 
States. The Monetary Union needed functional legitimacy which was to be appropriately 
institutionalised by means of a constitutional duty to guarantee price stability and regulations to counter 
excessive budget deficits. By putting such institutional provisos into practice, the court concluded, the 
objections against the democratic legitimacy of economic integration had resolved themselves. In other 
words, the European Union is permitted to constitutionalise itself as a “market without a state”, and its 
Member States may transform themselves into “states without markets”.82 
                                                     
78  Especially K. Dyson, The Road to Maastricht: Negotiating Economic and Monetary Union, (Oxford University Press, 1999). 
79  BVerfG 89, 155. 
80  Loc. cit., 186. 
81  J.H.H. Weiler, “Does Europe Need a Constitution? Reflections on Demos, Telos and the German Maastricht Decision”, 
(1995) 1 European Law Journal, 219-258, at 219 ff. B.-O. Bryde, “Die bundesrepublikanische Volksdemokratie als Irrweg 
der Demokratietheorie”, (1994) 5 Staatswissenschaften und Staatspraxis, 305-330. This assertion that none exists may be 
incorrect, for nobody can gain an overview of the immense literature on the Maastricht judgment; however, it is true that 
even an analysis as comprehensive as that by Franz C. Mayer (F.C. Mayer, Kompetenzüberschreitung und 
Letztentscheidung. Das Maastricht-Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts und die Letztentscheidung über Ultra-vires-Akte 
in Mehrebenensystemen; eine rechtsvergleichende Betrachtung von Konflikten zwischen Gerichten am Beispiel der EU 
und der USA, (C.H. Beck, 2000) does not deal with the decision’s problématique relating to the law of the economic 
constitution. 
82  Cf. already, C. Joerges, “States without a Market? Comments on the German Constitutional Court’s Maastricht-Judgment 
and a Plea for Interdisciplinary Discourses”, 1996, available at: http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/1997-020.htm, last accessed 22 
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This entailed a fair bit of hubris. The Monetary Union certainly depended on Germany. But was this to 
mean that it could be subjected to German conditions? The German Federal Constitutional Court 
emphasised this point with a threat: “The concept of the Monetary Union as a ‘Stabilitätsgemeinschaft’ 
(community of stability) is the basis and the object of the German law approving [entry into the union]. 
If the Monetary Union should be unable to continue to develop the stability existing at the beginning of 
the third phase in accordance with the agreed commitment to ensure stability, then it would abandon the 
contractual conception.” And if it should turn out “that the desired Monetary Union cannot be realized 
without an (as yet undesired) political union”, then a new political decision about how to proceed further 
would be required.83 Paul Kirchhof, the reporting Justice of the 2nd Senate, was an expert in public law 
and a Catholic, and not a “recognised” ordoliberal in either identity. It is all the more remarkable that 
he attempted to clarify the indeterminacies of the treaty text by means of a concept that reads as if it 
were ordoliberal and that was to make this interpretation binding across Europe. However, it very rapidly 
turned out that this was wishful thinking when that which was never to happen, according to the decision, 
actually did happen: the “community of stability” proved unstable. When in 1998, before entry into the 
third stage of the Monetary Union, the German Federal Constitutional Court was confronted with the 
demand to review whether the criteria it had formulated itself were being respected, the court had no 
other option but to refer to the prerogatives of the responsible state bodies to assess the matter.84 This 
was where the law entered into the crisis mode of European governance: political constraints prevailed 
over the legally formulated provisions.85 Hardly less astonishing than the statements by the Federal 
Constitutional Court on the legally binding nature of the “community of stability” was Mestmäcker’s 
assessment of the situation in 2007: “Trust in independent institutions, represented by German 
experiences with the Federal Constitutional Court and the Bundesbank, was probably the most important 
German contribution to the constitutional structure of the EC.”86 To be sure, this statement predates the 
crisis. But even in 2007, this was the same type of wishful thinking that we observed in the earlier phases 
of the project of integration.87 
Crisis policy: An “Ordoliberalisation of Europe” or the failure of the ordoliberal project? 
What is the state of the frequently invoked “ordoliberalisation of Europe”?88 Did ordoliberalisation 
prevail thanks to the crisis, whereas in the decades before it had made little impact and had remained 
wishful thinking? How could we tell? (1) By the Maastricht Treaty and the economic and monetary 
policy agreed in it? (2) By the crisis policy measures? (3) By the rulings on crisis policy? – Time and 
again in our discussion of these broad questions, we encounter the patterns that we faced throughout our 
reconstruction of the reception history of ordoliberalism. 
(1) The agreement on the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is largely considered the high point of 
the project of the internal market. The same is true of the assumption that the Monetary Union was a 
construct permeated with ordoliberalism. This is indeed corroborated by important factual, substantial, 
and institutional evidence. The most important evidence in factual terms is the commitment of monetary 
policy to price stability (Art. 127 TFEU; ex Article 105 EC Treaty), compliance with which the Federal 
                                                     
83  BVerfG 89, 155, margin numbers 90, 93. 
84  Decision of 31 March 1998, BVerfGE [Decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court] 97, 350. 
85  This was repeated in the most dramatic terms in the argument between the Federal Constitutional Court and the ECJ about 
the ECB’s OMT programme, which we discuss in Section 6. (3); “pereat iustitia, fiat mundus” (C. Joerges, (2016) 23 
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the law, but is not intended to insinuate, for example, that the EMU or its interpretation by the Federal Constitutional Court 
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86  E.-J. Mestmäcker, “Europäische Prüfsteine der Herrschaft und des Rechts”, (2007) 57 ORDO: Jahrbuch für die Ordnung 
von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 3-16, at 12. 
87  Cf. Section 5, a), b), c). 
88  Blyth, note 2 above, 142. 
Dead man walking: Current European interest in the ordoliberal tradition 
European University Institute 15 
Constitutional Court declared to be a precondition for Germany’s joining the Monetary Union, only to 
declare the stability of the “community of stability” to be a sine qua non of its binding nature for 
Germany.89 The most important institutional indicator is the establishment of the ECB and its being 
endowed with a degree of independence that is significantly greater than that of the German 
Bundesbank. Nonetheless, giving up the D-Mark remained very highly controversial among German 
economists. “The excessively hasty introduction of a European Monetary Union will expose Western 
Europe to strong economic tensions that could bring about a crucial political test in the foreseeable 
future, thereby endangering the goal of integration”, read one of the 11 points of a critical 
memorandum.90 Ultimately, what was likely decisive was not the discourse among experts, but 
politics.91 
We are not trying to reconstruct the processes of how it came into existence in order to determine which 
reasons were ultimately decisive; clearly, we are instead focusing on the body of rules established by 
the Maastricht Treaty. This regime lacks essential characteristics of a constitutional order. Instead, the 
EMU institutionalised a constellation of conflict that cannot be resolved. This came about by assigning 
monetary policy to the Union level, but retaining the nation-states’ responsibility for fiscal and economic 
policy, thus installing actors with markedly different preferences and interests for interdependent policy 
fields without creating a framework which would have allowed the political and economic conflicts 
arising from this situation to be resolved. The Stability Pact, which complements the EMU, was a lex 
imperfecta, and the Union’s competency to coordinate (Art. 121 TFEU) was feeble. However, the 
policy’s incoherences and laxness were by no means an accident or the result of poor craftsmanship in 
designing the treaty. National parliaments’ power of the purse is the core competency of parliaments in 
democracies. Nobody could expect of the Member States that they would relinquish fiscal policy in 
addition to monetary policy. Yet the protagonists of the EMU were certainly aware of the differences 
between economic cultures, including those within the euro area. They would also have had to 
acknowledge that the Union did not meet the conditions of an optimal currency area. A stipulation that 
strict rules would apply was therefore simply out of the question. It could only be about having as much 
leeway as possible for fine-tuning and political compromises - borne by that culture of unlimited 
optimism that European politics has relied on time and again.92 
(2) Was the crisis of the ordoliberal or neoliberal agenda at least followed by pertinent reactions, as was 
reported everywhere?
93 The flood of norms alone that are to bring the financial, sovereign debt, and 
economic crises under control should give pause. The collection of relevant legal texts compiled by 
Fernando Losada and Agustín José Menéndez,
94
 which does not even document the regulations 
subsequently introduced in the Member States, runs to 800 pages.
95 The extent and the density of this 
body of rules show that the crisis policy seeks to leave nothing to Hayek’s “competition as a discovery 
procedure”
96
 and blithely disregards the cautioning words from his Nobel Prize acceptance speech about 
                                                     
89  BVerfG 89, 155. 
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91  Abelshauser, note 59 above, 555 ff. 
92  Majone, note 60 above, 58 ff. 
93  Most recently, again with philosophical aspirations, Oksala, note 2 above, 181-196. 
94  F. Losada and A.J. Menéndez, “The Key Legal Texts of the European Crises. Treaties, Regulations, Directives, Case Law”, 
Oslo: ARENA Centre for European Studies, 2014; available at: http://www.sv.uio.no/arena/english/research/ 
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presumption of knowledge
97
. Instead, the agenda of the crisis policy is to force structural convergence 
in the euro area.
98 Not only von Hayek, but also Walter Eucken would be horrified: von Hayek because 
the massive interventionism disregards his economic-policy warnings and normative positions; Eucken 
because although the procedures of the crisis policy are supposed to increase “competitiveness” 
everywhere, the stony path to this faraway goal is pursued with economic-policy tools that have nothing 
in common with Eucken’s Ordnungspolitik.
99
 
But do the TSCG, the debt brake, the increasing competitiveness not correspond to the ordoliberal canon 
of values? Will, for this reason, an economic system be institutionalized in the end that respects and 
insists on market processes? For the time being, it is unforeseeable how and when the new forms of 
economic governance could be transformed into an Ordnungspolitik in the sense of the ordoliberal 
tradition. The specific feature of this policy was its legal force, the interdependency of legal order and 
economic order: Foucault understood this interdependency as follows: “What does applying the 
principle of the rule of law in the economic order mean? Roughly, I think it means that the state can 
make legal interventions in the economic order only if these legal interventions take the form solely of 
the introduction of formal principles. There can only be formal economic legislation. This is the 
principle of the Rule of law in the economic order.”
100 It was precisely this postulate of an economic 
policy bound to justiciable criteria that Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker declared to be indispensable.101 
(3) The likely most important ECJ decision since the famous reasons for the direct effect of sufficiently 
concrete provisions of the EEC Treaty in 1963102 is the Gauweiler decision of 16 June 2015.103 The ECJ 
had to examine the question presented to it by the German Federal Constitutional Court whether the 
ECB was respecting the limits on its monetary-policy mandate or was rather arrogating the economic-
policy competencies reserved for the Member States when it bought bonds from Member States that had 
gotten into financial difficulties, insisting that “[t]he granting of any financial assistance” remain bound 
to the “strict conditionality” that was demanded in return for the financial assistance (Art. 136 III TFEU). 
These conditionalities concern the financial- and economic-policy conduct of the Member State in 
question. Here, the ECJ considered itself authorized to clarify the constellation of conflict that was 
institutionalised with the establishment of the EMU: the Bank had been assigned a technically highly 
complex task, namely monetary policy, the fulfilment of which required relevant expertise. Performing 
this task independently, the court said, included the freedom of the ECB to determine autonomously 
what was required in terms of monetary policy. The assessment by the ECB of the economic situation 
and the ECB’s measures were legal, provided that “no obvious mistake in assessment could be 
determined”.104 The Gauweiler decision legalized the transformation of the economic order into a 
technocratic regime that owes nobody political responsibility and that draws its legitimacy from its 
expertise. Of course, this is a type of expertise that cannot rely on proven knowledge, but demands that 
its discretionary decisions in dealing with situations of uncertainty are respected as a matter of 
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principle.105 This case was observed and applauded in all the subdisciplines of European Studies, that is, 
by scholars of the law, politics, and economics.106 Following this development, it is no longer clear how 
ordoliberalism, a theory of economic law, could defend its theoretical core characteristics, namely 
commitment to the rule of law and guidance of economic policy by justiciable criteria. 
The disintegration of ordoliberalism in economic science 
So far, we have documented only the progressing “delegalisation” of “economic governance” that has 
culminated in the crisis policy. But the economic foundations of ordoliberalism have lost some of their 
previous attractiveness as well. This is a process extending far back into the last century.107 After the 
turn of the millennium, nothing less than a jolt of formalisation and modelling permeated the field of 
economic science in Germany. Ordnungsökonomik, which was sceptical about the mathematisation of 
the discipline and had a strong philosophical and normative orientation, slipped into the margins.108 
Apparently, it could no longer survive internationally in light of the dominance of universalistic Anglo-
Saxon microeconomics. Young German economists were faced with the choice of either turning away 
from the classical Ordnungsökonomik or being unable to keep up internationally. The Cologne methods 
dispute, which was sparked when six professorships previously tailored to Ordnungspolitik were to be 
filled, attracted considerable attention. Following two appeals published in the Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung and the Handelsblatt, a harsh exchange ensued in which 83 ordoliberals and 188 modernisers 
spoke out.109 The strongest critics of the reorientation included Hans Willgerodt (a nephew of Wilhelm 
Röpke, member of the Kronberger Kreis, and publisher of the Ordo Jahrbuch) and Christian Watrin (a 
student of Müller-Armack), both professors emeritus at Cologne University and representatives of 
Ordnungsökonomik. Both had directed the Institute for Economic Policy at the University of Cologne, 
which had been founded by Müller-Armack. The ordoliberal economists criticized modern economics 
for the wide discrepancy “between formal models defined for artificial worlds - [...] and the economic 
policy problems arising in our experiential world with its real institutions and real people”.110 German 
economists working abroad stated: “German economics is fossilized”;111 “many of the purely verbal 
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analyses to be found, for instance, in German-language journals [are] deeply permeated by ideology.”112 
They criticised the “separate path taken in Germany” which, they alleged, meant withdrawing into its 
“national shell”.113 German economists working in the US faulted a “doctrinaire provincialism” of 
“philosopher-economic policymakers in the German tradition” and called the Cologne methods dispute 
a “sideshow”.114 
In the end, the Anglo-Saxon camp prevailed once and for all. Tim Krieger, holder of the Endowed Chair 
for Constitutional Political Economy and Competition Policy in Freiburg, commented: “[A]fter 
Cologne, it was clear to us younger economists that we would not be appointed professors if we worked 
on classical Ordnungsökonomik; that is why we oriented our work toward the international 
developments in the discipline from the beginning.”115 
The fact that ordoliberalism still has considerable weight in some political and administration circles in 
Germany, however, could be recognized in two contributions to the dispute among economists. Then 
State Secretary in the Ministry for Economic Affairs Walther Otremba, who had prepared a doctorate 
on Barriers to Entry as a Problem of Competition Policy in Cologne in the 1970s, warned of overly 
strong mathematisation resulting from the planned reorientation of economics in Cologne, but admitted 
that “saying ‘Freiburg School’ in the morning and ‘Ludwig Erhard’ in the evening” would not suffice 
to keep up internationally.116 Weidmann, President of the Bundesbank, commented: “Personally, I 
couldn’t and still can’t glean much from this debate. Both are important; both complement each other: 
we need an economic policy framework founded on norms, that is, a guiding principle resting on proven 
principles.”117 
Ordoliberalism as political culture 
Jens Weidmann has mentioned Eucken in 33 of the 106 speeches he has given since becoming president 
of the Bundesbank in 2011. In a speech in Freiburg in 2013, he agreed with Lars Feld by repeating what 
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Feld had stated in the Wirtschaftswochein 2011: he recommended that during the crisis, all politicians 
should put Eucken’s “Grundsätze der Wirtschaftspolitik” (“Principles of Economic Policy”) under their 
pillows.118 Nor can Chancellor Merkel escape the spell of Freiburg. She made a point of travelling to 
Freiburg on the occasion of Eucken’s 125th birthday to declare her commitment to the principles of 
Ordnungspolitik.119 
The most conspicuous is Finance Minister Schäuble, who emphasises his Freiburg origins time and 
again (in 18 of his speeches between 1 January 2010 and 1 December 2015), thereby referring not only 
to his place of birth and alma mater, but also to the fundamentally ordoliberal orientation of his policies 
as finance minister. Between 1 January 2010 and 1 December 2015, he discussed the ordoliberal 
concepts “Ordnungsrahmen” and “Ordnungspolitik” 36 times in the 80 speeches and interviews 
referring to German solidarity during the euro crisis. The deep Protestant grammar can also be found in 
Schäuble’s argumentation. To Schäuble, the cause of the euro crisis is that some countries “lived far 
beyond their means until the crisis broke out”,120 and that the countries of the South cannot demand 
unconditional solidarity since “the standard of living, the population’s per capita income [...] was 
significantly lower in other euro area countries”.121 The countries’ behaviour had to change as a 
precondition for solidarity. Solidarity was not a “one-way street”;122 more “reliability”123 and more 
“solidity”124 was to be demanded of the crisis countries in return for solidarity. With these arguments, 
he takes up the Protestant core of empowerment which is embedded in ordoliberalism. Nonetheless, 
Schäuble appears unsure whether such appeals on moral grounds will be heard, “[f]or the terrible thing 
is: the fundamentals of human nature don’t change”.125 For that reason, the appeals to the debtor states’ 
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accessed 22 August 2017. 
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moral obligation had to be accompanied by strong institutions strengthening ethically correct behaviour. 
This, again, is a Protestant-ordoliberal platitude. Since humans are simultaneously sinful and justified, 
institutions had to safeguard that their behaviour is just. Schäuble makes the functioning of the assistance 
dependent upon the correct “incentive systems”.126 New institutions were to promote “helping the 
countries help themselves” (he refers to this in 11 of 80 speeches).127 To Schäuble, solidarity is 
necessarily linked to “conditionality” (he refers to this in 11 of 80 speeches),128 “consolidation” (he 
refers to this in 5 of his speeches),129 “discipline”,130 “sanctions”,131 and “monitoring”.132 
Schäuble’s calls for self-reliance, discipline, austerity, and modesty, which he seeks to stimulate by 
making moral appeals and institutional systems of incentives, are to be found not only in first-generation 
ordoliberalism, but also in the individual lay ethos of ascetic and pietistic Protestantism.133 In an 
interview with Der Spiegel, he emphasised, “My grandmother, who was from the Swabian Jura 
[translator’s note: an area known for its traditional frugality], used to say: good-naturedness precedes 
licentiousness. There is a kind of generosity that can quickly produce the opposite of what is 
intended.”134 In 2015, he gave a speech at the German Protestant Kirchentag (Church Congress). He was 
asked to discuss a passage from the Gospel of Luke against the background of the crisis in Greece. The 
parable suggests, figuratively, that one can agree to debt relief in certain circumstances. Schäuble 
comments: “Hard to believe what we read here”, and in his speech, he raises doubts about the accuracy 
of the Bible translation. He affirmed: “to forgive the debts someone has to another, and break the rules 
on your own authority: as a Christian, I cannot believe that Jesus recommends that we act in a way that 
would make it more difficult for people to live together, that would make life less safe, and that would 
make survival more laborious.”135 Then, he mentioned key values that are mentioned time and again in 
the first-generation ordoliberals’ books: helping people help themselves, the danger of the wrong 
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incentives, the advantages of frugality and of sustainable finances. He closed his speech with a reference 
to the original connection between ordoliberalism and Protestantism, referring to Dietrich Bonhöffer. 
The rationales used by leading German politicians are steeped in references to the Freiburg School and 
commitments to ordoliberalism. The discourse, however, is oriented more toward the general ordoliberal 
patterns and platitudes rather than referring to deeper levels of ordoliberal theory. It was especially the 
fusing of elements of ordoliberal economic theory and normative Protestant platitudes that makes the 
political discourse by politicians such as Schäuble so appealing to German voters. So it is not only a 
discourse about virtues, but a reference to the original underlying values that were built into the theory 
by ordoliberals in the 1930s and 1940s. Alongside the beguiling concepts of the social market economy 
and the economic miracle of the 1950s, the ordoliberalism of the Freiburg School has become a 
landmark in German collective memory. This is, however, a highly superficial adaptation of 
ordoliberalism lacking greater theoretical potency, but with considerable acceptance in the German 
electorate. 
Conclusion 
Legal scholars, the protagonists of ordoliberalism, have had to realize that its notions of a law of an 
economic constitution and a legally stipulated economic policy have failed.136 Ordoliberal positions have 
also been pushed to the sidelines in German economic science. What has been retained is common 
beliefs that even extend into the communication of German policy-makers. But neither in law nor in 
economics are authors to be found who represent a genuinely ordoliberal approach to overcoming the 
crisis. What remains is a popular ordoliberalism, an ordoliberalism of the people, which the German 
political community uses to give reasons for the crisis and rationalize tough measures while drawing on 
ordoliberal platitudes of the 1950s and arguments appealing to underlying Protestant values. American 
commentators have described all this as a “moral lesson”137 that divides the members of the European 
Union into “northern saints and southern sinners”138 during the crisis. It is the deep ordoliberal-Protestant 
grammar which Anglo-Saxon and southern European observers perceive in admonitions made by 
German politicians’ admonitions.
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